Abstracts of Recent Decisions by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1 Issue 2 
January 1916 
Abstracts of Recent Decisions 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Abstracts of Recent Decisions, 1 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 177 (1916). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1/iss2/11 
This Abstracts of Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES TO INFANTS-NEGLIGENT STORAGE OF EXPLOSIVES-
PROXIMATE CAUSES OF INJURY-TORTS OF INFANTS.-Where a plaintiff, aged
twelve, sued a quarrying company for injuries received when a dynamite
cap exploded in his hand, alleging that the injury was due to the negligent
storing of dynamite on the defendant's property, which was a place
attractive to infants, and that the plaintiff secured the cap from a fourteen-
year-old boy, who took it from the defendant's storehouse, the plaintiff
could not recover If the fourteen-year-old boy was sul juris, since in that
event his act, and not that of the defendant, was the proximate cause of
the injury. In the absence of any allegations or proof to the contrary, an
infant over fourteen is presumed to be sui juris. Bottorff vs. South Const.
Co., 110 N. E. 977.
APPEAL AND ERRoR-TELEGRAPH-ACTION FOR DELAY.-When a person has
received judgment against a telegraph company for injury due to the com-
pany's negligent delay in sending a message, the company cannot on appeal
raise the point that the telegram in question was an interstate message.
The point should have been raised on the original trial of the case. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Freeman. 180 S. W. (Ark.) 743.
The telegraph company's contention that the case of Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U. S. 542, applied was erroneous, for in that case
the telegram showed on its face that it was an interstate message.
CARaIERS-INJURY TO PASSENGER LEAVING THE CAR-DUTY OF EMPLOYEES.&-
The carrier owes the highest degree of care consistent with the nature of
the business, but employees are not under any absolute duty to know that
a passenger is attempting to alight from the car. When a street car is
stopped at or near a regular stopping place after a signal by the passen-
ger, this Is an invitation to the passenger to alight the instant the car
stops, and the passenger has a right to rely upon the car not being started
until a reasonable time has been given to alight. If, after the passenger
has signaled for the car to stop, the car is stopped near the regular stop-
ping place for some other purpose than allowing passengers to alight, the
duty is then on the car crew to prevent passengers from alighting. Terreflautle, L & E. Traction Co. vs. York, 110 N. E. 999 (Ind.).
CARRIERS-L.IABILITY FOR INJURIES TO PASSENGERs.-The porter and brake-
man, who told a woman that the train upon which she had passage would
connect with another railroad so that she would not have to wait over at
the junction point, were acting outside of their actual or apparent scope of
authority, and the defendant railroad is not liable for the suffering and
humiliation of the plaintiff caused by her having acted on these false state-
ments. Plaintiff had purchased her ticket only to th? junction point, and
defendant had no control over the connecting carrier. Texas & Pa. Ry. Co.
v. Conway, 180 S. W. (Tex.) 666.
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONs-HOsPITAL-LIABILITY FOR NEOLIGENcE.-A pay-
ing patient in a hospital conducted without aim of profit in which indigent
patients were treated free of cost sued for injury done him through negli-
gence of an attending nurse. Held: that he might recover damages.
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Asso., 68 So. 4.
Charitable corporations liable to injury to a pedestrian caused by the
negligence of its servants. Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 42 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1144.
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Liable unless there is an express contract exempting. Bonce v. Central
Methodist Church, 147 Mich. 230. So in Hordorn v. Salvation Army, 199
N. Y. 233, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 62.
But in Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. Ap. 675, it was held that
a charitable institution such as a hospital is not liable for the torts of its
servants nor for the negligence of the managers in the gelection of such
servants. So in Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn.' 98.
The fact that a public charitable hospital receives pay from a patient
for lodging and care does not affect its character as a charitable institution.
85 Ohio St. 90. See also McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass.
432, and Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294.
CLAYTON ACT-MoNOPOLTSTIc LEASES-APPLIcATION TO EXISTING CONTRACTS.
-Where the maker of a very large percentage of all the shoe machinery
made in the United States leases machines to shoe manufacturers with the
stipulation that the lessee shall not use the machine in the manufacture
of footwear which has not had certain essential operations performed on
it by other machines leased from the lessor, that he shall use the leased
machine exclusively for the work for which it was designed, that he shall
obtain all duplicate parts and supplies for the machine exclusively from
the lessor at such prices as it may establish, and other similar provisions,
and where the lessor further retains the right to remove all the leased
machines on the breach of any of these conditions, held, that such leases
are illegal, as in violation of the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 731). The Clayton
Act, Sec. 3, which makes it unlawful to lease or sell machinery, etc., on
any condition or agreement that will tend to prevent the lessee or pur-
chaser from dealing with competitors of the lessor or seller, is applicable
to a continuing contract of lease, although the lease was made before the
passage of the act. United Stlates vs. United Shoe Machinery Go., 227
Fed. 507.
CLAYTON AcT-SuIT' AGAINST CouRoRATIoN Fon VoILATIOn--TnANSACTINO
BuSINESS iN DISTaIcT.-In a suit by a Maryland corporation carrying
on business in Baltimore against an Illinois corporation for damages
for injury by defendant caused by acts alleged to be in violation of
the anti-trust laws of the United States the defendant appeared specially
for the sole purpose of moving to quash the marshal's return of service.
Defendant said that it was not liable on the suit in that district, in that
it neither resided, was found, transacted business, nor had agents therein.
It appeared that the defendant had men soliciting orders for its products
in Maryland, chiefly from jobbers, and for the purpose of promptly filling
such orders, kept a supply of goods with a storage company, which delivered
the same on advIces from the defendant's -officers in other states. Held,
that the defendant was transacting business in Maryland within the mean-
ing of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act (Oct. 15, 1914, C. 323, See. 12, 38 Stat.
736), that a suit could be maintained against it under the Act in that dis-
trict, and to avoid any question of service, the defendant might be brought
into court by process serve on it (subsequent to the suit here decided) in
the state of its incorporation. Frey and Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 228
Fed. 209.
COM .ERCE-POWERS OF INTERSTATE COMM IERCE 3OBnUSSION-ORDrU REQUI-
ING RAILROAD TO FURNISH CARs.-Reflners on the Pennsylvania Railroad
obtained an order from the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring the
railway to furnish tank cars. The railway obtained an injunction on the
ground that the Commission had no power to order the railway to furnish
cars either under the original act of 1887 or under the amendment of 1906.
Held. that the Commission exceeded its statutory power in making the
order and that the order be suspended and annulled. See note in this issue
for discussion of the duty of a railroad to furnish tank and other special
cars. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 227 Fed. 911.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISCRIMINATIoN-BULK SALES AcT.-The Sales in
Bulk Act (Ky. St. 1915, Sec. 2651a), enacted to prevent fraudulent sales,
providing that sales by a merchant of any part of his stock other than in
the ovdinary course of trade, or a sale of his stock in bulk, shall be void
as against the seller's creditors, unless the purchaser shall inquire of the
seller as to the names and residences of the seller's creditors in the course
of his business, and at least five days before the consummation of the sale
notify them of the intended sale, and further declaring a purchaser not
liable to any creditor not mentioned in the seller's statement, is not invalid
as being an unreasonable interference with the right of property. Such
an act Is not discriminatory within the fourteenth amendment to the fed-
eral Constitution in that it applies only to merchants, since that classifi-
cation is not an arbitrary one. Dwiggins Wire Fence Co. vs.,Patterson,
179 S. W. 224 (Ky.).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INJUNCTIoN RESTRAINING CRIMfINAL PROCEEDINGS-
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ALIENs.-Equity
has Jurisdiction to restrain the criminal prosecution of an employer under
the Arizona anti-alien labor law at the instance of an alien employee who
alleges that the act violates the federal Constitution and that its enforce-
ment will result in his immediate discharge. The discrimination against
aliens lawfully resident in the state, which is produced by the provisions
of the act of December 14. 1914, that every employer of more than five
workers at any one time shall employ not less than 80 per cent qualified
voters or native-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision
thereof, renders the statute under the fourteenth amendment to the federal
Constitution, as denying the equal protection of the law, and such a statute
can not be justified under the police power. Truax vs. Raiclh, 36 U. S.
Sup. 7.
Equal protection is due to aliens as well as to citizens. People vs.
Crane, 214 N. Y. 154. Courts of equity have no right to enjoin a criminal
prosecution unless the law is invalid and property rights are involved.
Dibrell vs. City of Coleman. 172 S. W. 550 (Texas). So in Critsinger vs.
City of Atlanta, 83 S. E. 263 (Georgia).
CON.sITTITION.,L LAxw-Lrc iqLTIVE POWFR UNDER CITY CHARTER.-Plaintiff,
a real estate dealer, sought to have the Board of Election Commissioners of
the City of St. Louis enjoined from holding an election on ordinances pro-
viding for Negro Segregation on the grounds of the constitutionality of the
initiative phase of the city charter. The Supreme Court of Missouri held
that the initative phase of the charter was in perfect accord with the State
Constitution, which adopts the initiative as a state policy: That the dele-
gation of legislative power to the municipal legislative assembly did not
vest in them exclusive power to legislate; and in the absence of any such
grant of exclusive power the initiative is in harmony with the state policy
adopted by the State Constitution. Where the people desire certain legis-
lation the legislative assembly may adopt it, but if it refuses to do so, the
people themselves by the initiative may act to secure the desired legis-
lation. Pitman v. Drabell, et al, Mo. Sup. Ct., Feb., 1916.
CORPORATIONS-RIGHT TO DIVIDEmD-NATURE OF REIMEDY-LIABILITY OF
NATIONAL BANK FOR MONEY RECEIVED UNDER CONTRACT ULTRA VIRES.--A
pledgee of corporate shares may recover from the corporation a dividend
declared thereon to the extent of his interest, and if the pledgor receives
the dividend, he holds it in trust for the pledgee; if the dividend is col-
lected by a third person having knowledge of the rights of pledgee, the
latter may recover it on the common count for money had and received.
A contractual relation between the parties is not necessary to support an
action of assumpsit for money had and received, which is based on an
equitable right from which a promise Is implied. A national bank which
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has received money equitably belonging to another cannot defend a suit
for Its recovery on the ground that it was received as an incident of a
contract made by the bank, which was ultra vires and not enforceable.
National Bank of Commerce vs. Equitable Trust Co., 227 Fed. 526. So In
Meredith Village Savings Bank vs. Marshall, 68 N. H. 417.
CRIMINAL LA-W-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COURT-SuBSTITUTION OF JUnoE DuR.
ING TRIAL.-The constitutional right of "trial by jury" in Federal courts
means a trial by twelve men, presided over by a judge. The continuous
presence of a judge and jury of twelve men is necessary, and another judge
cannot lawfully be substituted for the one before whom the trial was
commenced, during its progress, and while the testimony is being taken.
Freeman vs. United Sttztes, 227 Fed. 732.
DiVORCE-JUDGMIENT-SHowING MERITORIOUs DsFEmsE.-Plaintiff received a
divorce from defendant on the grounds of abandonment and adultery.,
Defendant was not notified of the day of the trial and he attempted to
have the judgment set aside on the ground that he had a good defense
to the abandonment charge. But the court held that it was not enough
that he stated facts sufficient to be a good ground of defence to the
abandonment charge. He must state facts that would be a good defense
to both grounds. Wade v. Wade, 180 S. W. (Tex.) 643.
EVIDENCE-INTERSTATE COmmERCE ACT-PUBLICATION OF RATE.-Where the
Interstate Commerce Commission had approved a new schedule of rates
of a railroad, It Is presumed that the railroad had complied with the
statute requiring them to give thirty days notice to the Commission and
to the public before the rate should go Into effect. International & G. N.
Ry. Co. v. Carter, 180 S. W. (Tex.) 663. The publication of the rates is
something to be done before the Commission approves the rate. U. S. v.
Miller, 223 U. S. 599.
HA3EAS CORPUS- IMMIGRATION CASES-CONCLUSIVENESS OF DECISIONS Or
IMMIORATION OFFICERS-DEPORTATION OF Aazs.-An alien, detained by the
Commissioner of Immigration for deportation for a cause not recognized as
sufficient by the act of February 20, 1907 (34 Stat. at L. 898, Ch. 1134),
as amended by the act of March 26, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 263, Ch. 128) is
entitled to demand his release by habeas corpus. The decisions of immi-
gration officers under this act are conclusive merely as to matters of fact,
not as to matters of law. Alien immigrants cannot be deported under this
act as "persons likely to become a public charge" merely because the labor
market In the city of their immediate destination is overstocked. Gegiow
vs. Uhl, 36 U. S. Sup. 2.
Decisions of inspectors are conclusive only as to matters of fact.
Davies vs. Manolis, 103 C. C. A. 310. Since immigration officials are ad-
ministrative officers and their decisions are those of the executive depart-
ment of the government, an order discharging an alien cannot operate
as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding for deportation. Sire vs.
Berkshire, 185 Fed. 967. Where a Chinese person claiming to enter the
United States as a native born citizen was not given a fair trial, a writ
of habeas corpus is the proper remedy. 109 C. C. A. 310. Where the alien
has been In this country longer than three years, has left the country, and
is now seeking to re-enter, the decision of the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor is not final in proceedings to deport, but the court on habeas corpus
may inquire Into the whole case. Redfern vs. Halpert, 108 C. C. A. 262.
The decision of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor Is final in deporta-
tion proceedings during the three-year period of probation. Prentis vs.
Di Giacoma, 192 Fed. 467. Ex parte Puglie8e, 209 Fed. 720. The fact that
the demand for a certain class of labor is very slight is no reason for
deportation on the ground that the immigrant Is likely to become a public
charge. Ex parte Gregory, 210 Fed. 680.
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INDM UNITY-NOTICE or" ACCEPTANE.-A bond under seal, delivered by the
obligors to the obligee, conditioned upon the Indemnification of the latter,
a surety company, for all losses under an official bond upon which the
surety company "has become or is about to become surety," is a completed
contract of indemnity or guaranty which binds the obligors without any
notice that it has been accepted and acted upon by the obligee. U. S.
Fidelity and G. Co. vs. Riefler, 36 U. S. Sup. 12. The rule, requiring
notice by the guarantee of his acceptance of the guaranty, and his in-
tention to act under it, applies only where the instrument being, In legal
effect, merely an offer or proposal, such acceptance is necessary to that
mutual assent, without which there can be no contract. If made at the
request of the guarantee, the guaranty becomes the .nswer of the guar-
antor to a proposal, and Its delivery to the guarantee or for his use
completes the contract. Davis vs. Wells. Fargo & Co.. 104 U. S. 159. In
Davis Sewing Machine Co. vs. Richards, 115 U. S. 524, the defendant
signed a guaranty of the future performance of his contract by the
plaintiff's agent. No notice of acceptance by the guarantee was given
to the guarantor. Held, that this was an incomplete contract of guaranty.
INJUNCTION----CIVIL RIGHTS-EXCLUDING CRrrIcs FROM THEATERs.-Theater
managers in New York excluded from their playhouses a newspaper
dramatic critic who had severely criticized their productions. He obtained
an injunction restraining the theater managers from excluding him, but
on appeal the Appellate Division reversed the decision declaring his remedy
under the Civil Rights Law to be adequate. Woolcot1t v. Shubert, 154 N. Y.
Sup. 643. Dowling, J., dissented on the ground that the defendants own
a great many theaters In New York City and the plaintiff's means of liveli-
hood would be seriously impaired by being excluded therefrom, for his
value to the newspaper employing him would be virtually destroyed, and
that the statutory remedy was inadequate to protect the rights of the
plaintiff conferred upon him by statute.
INTERNAL REvENUE-ExcIsE ON CORPORATION- "DoING BusINEss."-The
question as to what acts of a corporation amount to "doing business" under
the act of Congress approved August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36 Stat. II (Comp. St.
1913, Sec. 6300-6308), passed on in Public Service Railway G'o. and Rapid
Transit Street Railway Co. v. Herold, 219 Fed. 301, and before the Supreme
Court in McCoach v. Minehill Railway Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419,
57 L. Ed. 842, has received further treatment in six cases before Circuit
Judge Hunt (Dist. Ct. D. New Jersey). The actions were to recover taxes
paid under the Corporation Tax Law. A corporation held to be "doing
business" where, though leasing all its property and franchises, except its
franchise to be a corporation, It yet exerts its corporate powers, as by
issuance of bonds to increase its estate, or does acts not reasonably neces-
sary to eaable the lessee to enjoy the rights in existence at the time of the
lease. Public Service Electric Co. v. Herold, 227 Fed. 486. Held, to
be "doing business" by exerting its power for the acquisition of additional
franchise rights (having previously leased all property and franchises).
Public Service Ry. Co. v. Herold, 227 Fed. 490. Having leased plant, prop-
erty and franchises, except franchise to be a corporation, heldi to be
"doing business" because one of the express purposes of Its incorporation
was to lease such plants. Public Service Electric Co. et al. v. Herold, 227
Fed. 491. Where the corporation leased its business but reserved the right
to extend the business for the benefit of the lessee, at the lessee's request,
held, to be "doing business" by a substantial exercise of the reserve power,
though for the benefit of the lessee as well as itself. Public Service Ry.
Co. v. Moffett, 227 Fed. 494. But where the corporation leased all property
and contracts, with right to use lessor's name where necessary, the lessee
agreeing to follow out the lessor's plan, the lessor, however, retaining its
corporate organization, paying salary of secretary, directors' fees, Interest
on bonds, and expenses of distributing dividends, and even voting stock
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in another corporation, held, not to be "doing business." Public Gas
Service Co. v. Herold, 227 Fed. 496. And where the lessee ran business
and agreed to make the necessary extensions of line, the lessor performing
no acts save receiving rentals, held, not liable for taxes because not "doing
business." Public Service Ry. Co. et al. v. Herold, 227 Fed. 500. The suits
for recovery relate to a particular year, or to particular years.
INTERPRETATIoN-HARRISoN AN I-NARcoTic LAw.-Under the Harrison Anti-
Narcotic law the question has arisen as to whether a person having the
drugs in his possession, though not apparently coming within any of the
classifications of persons set out In the act, can be held guilty under its
provisions. The cases bearing on this point are discussed In a note In
this issue.
INTFRPRETATION-RE-ENACTMENT OF STATUTES-CONTINUITY OF PROVISIONS.-
Where an amendatory act re-enacts provisions of the original statute in
the same or substantially the same language, and the original statute is
repealed, such provisions will not be considered as repealed and then
re-enacted, but will be regarded as having been continuous and undis-
turbed by the amendatory act. A statute providing that conviction for a
second offense shall be followed by imprisonment in the penitentiary Is
not ex post facto or retroactive when applied to a case where the second
offense was committed after the enactment of the provision for the pun-
Ishment of the second offense although the first offense was committed
prior to the enactment of such provision. Where a person who is con-
victed under a statute prescribing a definite term of Imprisonment Is
given an indeterminate sentence, the question of the validity of the statute
authorizing such indeterminate sentence cannot be raised in an habeas
corpus proceeding. Ex parte Allen, 110 N. E. 535 (Ohio).
INTERSTATE COmmERCE-BILLING TO FICTITIOUS PERSON-ENTRAPMENT.-
Where defendant sold an obscene book and sent it by interstate express,
billed to a person of the name given him by the buyer, the character of
the transaction as commerce Is not affected by the name being fictitious.
Hanish vs. U. S. 227 Fed. 584.
LICENSE-APPROPRIATION OF LICENSE BY THE UNITED STATEs.-The Act of
June 25, 1910, c. 423, 36 Stat. 851, which provides that the owner of a
patent covering an Invention which shall be used by the United States
without license may recover reasonable compensation for such use by suit
in the Court of Claims, In effect provides for the appropriation by the
government, by right of eminent domain, of a license to make or use any
patented invention; and, having such right, the government may contract
for the making of all or any part of the same, and the contractor is pro-
tected against liability for the infringement, the owner of the patent being
limited to the remedy provided by the statute. Marconi Wireless Telegraph
Co. vs. Simon, 227 Fed. 906.
QUALIFICATIONS OF GRAND JUnORS-IISCONDUCT OF ArOuNEYS BEFORE TIHE
GRAND JURY.-A grand juror having been duly drawn and summoned for
service in a federal court, and having the qualifications prescribed by law
does not become disqualified for service because he thereafter loses a
property qualification, which takes him out of the class of voters from
which jurors are selected. A plea in abatement on the ground of miscon-
duct of the government attorneys In the grand jury room must set out
facts which raise a legal presumption of prejudice. United St'ates vs.
Gradwefl et al, 227 Fed. 243.
REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE Co1mIIssioN.-A con-
clusion of the Interstate Commerce Commission on a pure question of
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fact, such as the reasonableness of a rate or the giving of a preference
will not be reviewed by the court; but a conclusion which plainly involves,
inder the undisputed facts, an error of law, or which is shown to be sup-
ported by no substantial evidence, or to be directly contrary to the evi-
dence, thereby also involving an error of law, will be so reviewed.
Louisrille & N. R. Co. vs. United States, 227 Fed. 258.
SARBATH BREAKING-RECOVFRY FOR WORK DONE ON SUNDAY.-In a suit by
a newspaper for the balance due on a contract for printing, the defendant
denied liability for such part of the work as was done on Sunday under a
statute (R. S. Mo. 1909, Sec. 4801) making it a misdemeanor to do unnec-
essary work on Sunday. Held (Supreme Court), that a Sunday newspaper
Is a necessity. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. McNichols, 181 S. W. 1.
The Missouri Court of Appeals held in Barney v. Spangler, 131 Mo. A.
58, that one might not recover for work done on Sunday.
SAL. S-WARPANTIES-EFFECT OF RETAINING THE PI3OPERTY.-In a suit for
the recovery of the purchase price of an engine furnished under a con-
tract making the performance of certain tests by the engine conditions
precedent to any liability for the engine, it appeared that though the tests
had been unsatisfactory, the defendant had retained and continued to use
the engine though refusing to accept or pay for It. The defendant con-
tended that the contract was executory and no liability had arisen. Held,
that the summons called upon the defendant either to reject the engine
and demand its removal or to accept It and rely on a recovery of damages
for any breach of the contract, and that his election to keep and use the
engine caused the title to pass, and the conditions precedent to become
collateral agreements. Crescent Milling Co. v. H. N. Strait Mfg. Co., 227
Fed. 804.
TAXATION-EXEMPTION-TRANSFER OF IMmuNITY.-Any contract exemption
from taxation which may have been created by a provision in the charter
of a canal and banking company which limits the exemption thereby
granted to such property "as Is possessed, occupied, and used by the said
company for the actual and necessary purposes of said canal navigation,"
did not pass to its grantee and lessee in favor of which the canal company
exercised the right given to It by the New Jersey Act of March 14, 1871,
to lease the canal or any part thereof. Morris Canal and Banking Co. vs.
Baird et al., 36 U. S. Sup. 28.
A subrogation by statute of one corporation to the right and privileges
of a fd~mer corporation, does not include an Immunity from taxation.
Gulf & Ship Island R. Co. vs. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66. An exemption from
taxation is personal and cannot be assigned except by legislative authority.
State ex rel. Wine vs. Keokuk & W. R. Co. 99 Mo. 30. 'So In Keokuk 4
W. R. Co. vs. State of Missouri. 152 U. S. 301. A railroad cannot, by sale,
transfer its exemption under the state constitution, but Its consolidation
with another railroad will not destroy its exemption. Rock Island A. &
L. R. Co. vs. State Board of Appraisers of Louisiana, 133 La. 674.
WILLs-DESIGNATION OF LEGATEES-WORDS OF RELATioNsHn.-By Item
second of a will, testator made a bequest "to each of my relatives and
kindred by blood of the first and second degree," and by Item third made
a different bequest to an uncle, "he to receive nothing under Item second
hereof." By the civil law there was but one person, a half-sister, who
came within the terms of item second, and under the laws of the state,
in case of Intestacy, she would have Inherited the entire estate, while,
on the other hand, there were a number of persons, Including the uncle
mentioned, who were blood relatives of the first and second degrees by
the canonical law. Held, that the testator evidently had In mind the latter
law, and Intended that It should govern in determining the legatees.
Wheat vs. Hill, 227 Fed. 984.
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